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1. Introduction
In most European countries, fertility rates dropped below the replacement 
level of 2.1 children per woman in the 1970s. In many countries, such 
as Germany, Italy and Spain, there has been a steady decline ever since 
(Grant et al. 2004). In the wake of this decline, policies dealing with !nan-
cial support for families and the subsidisation and organisation of child 
care have gained in importance and are much debated. Philosophers, too, 
have thought hard about the question of whether the community at large 
should be responsible for bearing the costs of raising the next generation. 
"ere is an active !eld of research dealing with the following two ques-
tions:
1. What are children owed? 
2. Who should pay for the children? 
Much of this literature is very applied and policy-oriented, such as Alstott 
(2004), Brighouse (2005), Folbre (2008), Garofalo and Robeyns (2009) 
and Daly and Rake (2003). But surprisingly little has been written on 
what the dominant theories of justice might respond to these questions. 
I want to explore the implications of luck egalitarianism as one of the 
major frameworks in contemporary political philosophy with regard to 
these questions – both because it is one of the intuitively most plausible 
views on justice, and because questions of procreation pose some interest-
ing problems for this framework. 
 Luck egalitarianism is the view that people should be equally well o# 
as everybody else in a society, unless di#erences are due to choices they 
can be held responsible for. On !rst inspection, luck egalitarianism does 
indeed seem to imply answers to both the questions posed above, namely 
that children are owed equal life prospects to everybody else, and that 
parents should pay. However, the combination of these answers  would 
be overly demanding in the realm of non-ideal theory, that is, theorising 
which takes into account existing injustices: it is too harsh towards parents 
who are themselves disadvantaged in an unjust society. Luck egalitarian-
ism is an ideal theory in the sense that we usually assume a just society 
of perfect equality as a starting point and then see whether di#erences 
are caused by conscious choice. It is this assumption that gives rise to the 
counterintuitive responses to the above questions. So the luck egalitarian 
will have to adapt her answers to a non-ideal world, or so I will argue. 
 "is is no attack on the luck egalitarian framework: As most compre-
hensive theories of justice, luck egalitarianism remains mostly silent on 
what justice implies for a non-ideal world (see Swift 2008). In fact, this 
may be a reason why the literature dealing with questions of procreative 
justice is more policy-oriented, and relatively detached from debates about 
comprehensive theories of justice. 
 "e purpose of this paper is to show that despite these problems, luck 
egalitarianism can still provide a valuable insight: many of the costs of chil-
dren are costs which arise from the children’s rights of egalitarian justice. 
Even when we hold parents responsible for their procreative decisions, 
there may be reasons in non-ideal theory to refrain from holding parents 
responsible for these particular costs in full. It seems unacceptable to make 
parents pay the full costs of egalitarian justice when they themselves have 
been disadvantaged in an unequal society. "is provides a distinct argu-
ment for some form of joint responsibility for children.
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2. Luck egalitarianism and responsibility
To motivate luck egalitarian answers to our guiding questions of what chil-
dren are owed and who should pay for them, this section introduces the 
luck egalitarian framework and its central intuition. We will not have to go 
into much detail of the di#erent accounts of luck egalitarianism to moti-
vate these answers, so the discussion will remain fairly general.
 Luck egalitarianism is still one of the dominant strands of egalitarian-
ism amongst contemporary theorists of justice, counting R. Dworkin, R. 
Arneson and G. Cohen amongst its proponents. It also expresses some of 
the most widely held intuitions about egalitarian justice. With this wide 
base of support, it is inevitable that there is much diversity within luck 
egalitarianism. What I want to do here is just to give a general impres-
sion of the main tenets of luck egalitarianism. Along with Knight (2009a), 
and arguably also Anderson (1999), I take the main idea to be this: luck 
egalitarianism holds that people should be equal with respect to a metric 
of justice (such as resources or welfare) unless di#erences are due to choices 
people can be held responsible for. Let us see how this idea encompasses 
some of the main luck egalitarian distinctions and internal debates.
 A common distinction within luck egalitarianism is that between 
option luck and brute luck, !rst established by Dworkin: 
‘Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn 
out—whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk 
he or she should have anticipated and might have declined’.
Accordingly, brute luck is 
‘a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles’ 
(Dworkin, 2000: 73).
For instance, being born with a severe disability is a matter of brute luck. 
But a well-informed hobby parachutist ending up disabled after a para-
chuting accident is a matter of option luck. Using this terminology, luck 
egalitarianism holds that people should be compensated for di#erences 
due to brute luck alone. 
 Another way of characterising the luck egalitarian intuition, also from 
Dworkin, is that distributive principles should be ambition-sensitive, but 
endowment-insensitive. Endowments include the initial resources avail-
able to people, as well as their natural advantages or disadvantages, such as 
disabilities. When a distributive principle is endowment-insensitive, then 
the !nal distribution should not re$ect initial di#erences in endowments. 
All di#erences should be due to di#erences in ambition.
 Looking at Knight’s (2009a) characterisation and the two characteri-
sations based on Dworkin’s distinctions, saying that (1) people should be 
compensated for disadvantages they are not responsible for, (2) people 
should be compensated for di#erences in brute luck, and (3) our distribu-
tive principles should be ambition-sensitive but endowment-insensitive 
may not be equivalent ways of spelling out the luck egalitarian intuition - 
depending on how the crucial terms in these characterisations are spelt out 
exactly. However, I want to argue that there is some ground for holding 
that (1) is basic to luck egalitarianism, and that (2) and (3) are di#er-
ent interpretations given to it by theorists like Dworkin. Like Knight, I 
want to focus on responsibility. "ere are two reasons for the claim that 
responsibility is basic: thinking about responsibility helps us make sense of 
internal debates within luck egalitarianism, and an appeal to responsibility 
is what makes luck egalitarianism normatively compelling.
 To start with the !rst, the centrality of the notion of responsibility 
for theorists of luck egalitarianism becomes apparent, for instance, in the 
debate about expensive tastes. We speak of expensive tastes when people 
have tastes that make it more expensive to make them equal to everybody 
else with regard to the metric of justice. For instance, if I need champagne 
before my dinner in order not to be completely miserable, then it will be 
very expensive to keep me as happy as the rest of us. Luck egalitarians 
all agree that we should compensate for disadvantages caused by physi-
cal or mental handicaps. However it is not clear how expensive tastes are 
relevantly di#erent from such handicaps – some of my tastes may be as 
entrenched as physical handicaps. "ere is an active debate about whether 
and how expensive tastes may be di#erent from natural disadvantages (see 
Knight 2009b). What is important for my point is that this debate appears 
to revolve around the notion of responsibility: What luck egalitarians want 
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to say is that while we can never be held responsible for inherited handi-
caps, it may be that we can be held responsible for some of our expensive 
tastes. Cohen, for instance, holds that expensive tastes we would now 
choose not to have can be used as the basis for compensation, but not 
others (see Cohen 1989, 2004). Dworkin (2000) uses a stricter criterion, 
and puts all ‘ambitions’ on the side of tastes we can be held responsible for, 
and works out a number of speci!c criteria to distinguish ambitions from 
natural endowments. 
 One interpretation of Cohen and Dworkin is that they aim to estab-
lish what makes a person responsible for their choices. In Cohen’s case, we 
are responsible when our preferences are such that we would now choose 
to have them. And in Dworkin’s case, we are responsible for our ambitions. 
"is interpretation is not only intuitively appealing; it is also rendered 
more plausible by the observation that both Dworkin and Cohen invoke 
the idea of personal identity. Dworkin does so directly by speaking of 
ambition as belonging to somebody’s personhood. He writes that 
‘[i]t is true that this argument produces a certain view of the distinction 
between a person and his circumstances, and assigns his tastes and 
ambitions to his person, and his physical and mental powers to his 
circumstances.’ (2000: 81)
Cohen invokes an idea of second-order preferences – preferences over the 
preferences that guide our behaviour. "e latter is very much reminiscent 
of Frankfurt’s (1971) account of moral responsibility, which also intimately 
links responsibility with personal identity, and conceives of personal iden-
tity as higher order preference. Roughly, he thinks that our intimate self is 
constituted by the wishes we have about what our preferences in everyday 
situations should be, our preferences over preferences. Moral responsibility, 
too, has to do with higher-order preferences, in that we are responsible for 
an action if that action is in accordance with our higher-order preferences, 
with those preferences that constitute our personal identity. Frankfurt 
represents a tradition that views responsibility and personal identity as 
closely interconnected. In the light of this tradition it makes sense to inter-
pret the debate about expensive tastes to revolve around when something 
is considered one’s own responsibility. Obviously there is much disagree-
ment about what responsibility implies, but this disagreement aligns well 
with the disagreements within luck egalitarianism itself.
 Turning to the second reason, responsibility is central to the norma-
tive appeal of luck egalitarianism. When one is told that people should 
be compensated for natural disadvantages alone, or for di#erences in 
brute luck alone, it is not unreasonable to ask why this should be the 
case. Further justi!cation may be called for. An appeal to responsibility 
may provide such further justi!cation. For instance, we could say that it 
would be unjust for people to be worse o# through no fault of their own. 
"is justi!cation argues from an appeal to responsibility to egalitarianism. 
Alternatively, we may say that we presuppose a strong egalitarian intuition, 
but then appeal to responsibility to limit it. While we should generally 
compensate for di#erences, it would be unjust to make everybody pay to 
compensate somebody who is worse o# through their own fault. In any 
case, if we were to accept that people are not responsible for their natural 
disadvantage, or that they are not responsible for their brute luck, appeal 
to responsibility can normatively justify why Dworkin’s two distinctions 
should matter for egalitarian justice. It is hence normatively more basic. 
Of course, again, it is very much an open question what people can be held 
responsible for. All I am saying is that Dworkin’s appeals to option luck 
and to ambition should be understood as speci!c answers to that question.
 So for these reasons, luck egalitarianism is best characterised as fol-
lows: people should be equal with respect to the preferred metric of justice 
unless di#erences are due to choices people can be held responsible for. 
But we can say more than that. We have just seen that responsibility can be 
appealed to in two di#erent ways to argue for this central luck egalitarian 
claim. Accordingly, luck egalitarianism can be characterised by its turning 
against two kinds of injustice. Most defences of luck egalitarianism take 
a case of inequality and argue that it is unjust when it is due to natural 
disadvantage. But we can also look at it from the other side. We could, 
for instance, start from the idea that equality of welfare is a good thing. 
"e luck egalitarian position can then be motivated from a particular fail-
ing of this simple egalitarianism. If people know that equality of welfare 
will be restored following all their choices, they make these choices, and 
develop their ambitions without facing their true costs. "e costs will be 
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spread amongst all. We could understand this as an externality problem. 
Consequently, the inherent structure of simple welfare egalitarianism can 
lead to situations that are both ine%cient, in the welfare economic sense, 
and may seem unfair. "ere is a second kind of injustice that luck egalita-
rians turn against, namely the injustice of having to compensate somebody 
for choices they can be held responsible for. Dworkin is writing from this 
perspective in the sentence following the above quotation: 
‘"at is the view of a person […] as someone who forms his ambitions 
with a sense of their cost to others against some presumed initial equality 
of economic power.’ (2000: 81-82)
As a rough characterisation, we can hence say that luck egalitarianism turns 
against two perceived classes of injustice: "e injustice of being worse o# 
than others through no fault of one’s own; and the injustice of having to 
compensate people for expensive choices they made willingly and know-
ingly, and with no input from those asked to compensate. 
3. What are children owed?
What does luck egalitarianism have to say about procreation? Let us !rst 
focus on the children. What is unique about procreative decisions is that 
they result in the existence of persons who did not exist before, and who 
will be taken seriously as subjects in a theory of justice. Focusing on these 
newly created persons, luck egalitarians would presumably say that they 
cannot be held responsible for the circumstances they are born into. So, 
depending on one’s account of luck egalitarianism, one would either say 
that family background is a matter of brute luck, or part of one’s endow-
ment. Considering the e#ect of a family’s socio-economic and educational 
background on the life prospects of a child (see Bradley and Corwyn 
2002, Davis-Kean 2005, Mayer 2002), luck egalitarians would argue for 
compensation for di#erences in family background, and measures to keep 
the e#ects of background in check (see Segall 2011). "is can provide an 
answer to the question of what children are owed: children are owed equal 
life prospects, an expectation to do as well as everybody else with regard to 
the metric of justice, independently of family background.
 When it comes to correcting injustices, there are deontic and tele-
ological interpretations of egalitarianism. Deontic egalitarians hold that 
those worse o# through no fault of their own have a claim-right to com-
pensation, while those better o# have a duty to compensate. Teleological 
egalitarians think that equality is a value and that it is good for inequali-
ties to be compensated when they are the result of brute luck. "is avoids 
the language of claim-rights and duties, by putting the central egalitarian 
claims in terms of the value attached to certain pattern of distribution. 
Still, it can be said that this approach identi!es the receivers as those with 
bad brute options luck and the donators as those who are better o#. Tem-
kin (1993) subsumes both approaches under one terminology by saying 
that the worse o# have complaints. I will stick to the deontic account here, 
which is also the more common one – especially when equality is thought 
of as a matter of justice. "is makes the following discussion more straight-
forward. It is possible, however, to think of everything I say in teleological 
terms as well. On this deontic interpretation, then, luck egalitarianism 
holds that every child has a claim-right to life prospects equal to those of 
the rest of the population. By having a child, parents create a person with 
such a right. 
 Next, we would like to answer the question of who should pay for 
the children. Before answering that question, it would be helpful to know 
what children cost. But the costs of children are at least partly depend-
ent on what children are owed. In fact it is very hard to de!ne the costs 
of children (see Folbre 2008). But at the very least, they include things 
that children have a moral right to, such as the care and means to cover 
their basic needs. According to luck egalitarianism, equal life prospects are 
amongst the things that children have a moral right to. So a luck egalitar-
ian would have to say that the costs of children include whatever is needed 
to ensure these.
4. Who should pay for the children?
Focusing on the parents, a luck egalitarian would say that to the extent 
that procreation is a conscious choice, parents are responsible for their 
procreative decisions. At least in the developed world, procreation is often, 
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if not most of the time, a matter of choice, or the result of a risk taken 
willingly and knowingly, and would hence be counted as option luck. 
"e luck egalitarian may conclude that in most cases, parents should not 
be compensated for the costs of children (see Casal and Williams 2004, 
Rakowski 1991). 
 While the luck egalitarian answer to the !rst question above, concern-
ing what children are owed, is more consensual, there is much opposition 
to this luck egalitarian answer to the second question. "at disadvantaged 
parents should be supported in raising their children is a very strongly 
held belief amongst many philosophers writing on these issues. Indeed, 
some have argued for this view from within the luck egalitarian frame-
work, thereby denying that the luck egalitarian answer I just described is 
unavoidable. I address some of these arguments in the following, but will 
argue that they should fail to convince the luck egalitarian.
 In her No Exit, Alstott (2004) argues that child-rearing should not be 
regarded as an ‘expensive taste’, and that appeals to the parents’ responsibil-
ity are irrelevant in the case of child-rearing. "e main theme of her book 
is that society has a mutual obligation to care for children, irrespective of 
parents’ responsibility for their decisions. "ere is a ‘no exit’ command 
for parents to provide ‘direct, intimate and continuous care’ (2004: 38) 
for their children. According to Alstott, such care by at least one parent 
is essential for the child’s well-being. She further argues that this restricts 
the parents’ autonomy considerably, and uses this to justify state com-
pensation for the parents’ e#orts, as well as enforcement of the caring 
commitment. While the parents should normally be the ones ful!lling the 
‘no exit’ command, society has a mutual obligation that children are cared 
for, and should assist the parents. Alstott’s argument does not appeal to the 
parents’ responsibility for their procreative decisions, and she denies that 
responsibility can undermine her argument. "is is where her argument 
that child-rearing is not an expensive taste comes in (2000: 61-63).
 As we have seen, luck egalitarians usually appeal to expensive tastes to 
make an argument along the following lines: if somebody makes certain 
choices because she has tastes which are expensive to ful!l, she cannot 
expect the community to compensate her for the costs. Applied to chil-
dren, this is an argument against state support for parents: parents make 
the expensive decision to have children, and should not expect the com-
munity to compensate them. Against this conclusion, Alstott now claims 
that, !rstly, often parenthood is not chosen, and, secondly, even in the 
cases where it is, child-rearing is expensive because it must be ‘enforced’. 
 It is hard to interpret what she means by this second claim, or how 
this is an argument against holding parents responsible for the costs of 
children. I can see two possible interpretations of how enforcement makes 
child-rearing expensive. However, on neither does Alstott succeed to refute 
the expensive tastes challenge. 
 Firstly, we may interpret enforcement as something that only comes 
into play once parents have already failed to care for their children ade-
quately. When parents have failed to care for their children by themselves, 
it is important that the state should act so that the children receive the care 
they need. In this case, Alstott has done nothing to refute the expensive 
tastes argument: the state support she argues for can in fact be interpreted 
as supplementary to the position that parents should be held responsi-
ble. We could view child-rearing as an expensive taste, the costs of which 
parents are responsible for. But of course people can always fail to live 
up to their responsibilities. "e parents’ failure to care for their children 
could be seen as a failure to live up to their responsibility, and the state 
would only come in to clear up the damages of the parents’ moral failure. 
Enforcement matters when parents fail in their duties of responsibility. 
Alstott’s argument would then simply be that parents frequently fail with-
out enforcement. 
 On the second interpretation, enforcement is not merely associated 
with failure to ful!l duties. Rather, it is acknowledged by those to whom 
the enforcement is applied as a necessary incentive mechanism that helps 
them meet their commitments. "is acknowledgement may spring from 
people’s awareness of their own weakness of will or short-sightedness. 
Alstott clearly thinks that enforcement is necessary – so presumably it is 
possible for responsible and forward-looking parents to anticipate that 
they will need to be given incentives to meet their commitments on a day-
to-day basis. But if this is the case, and parents still decide to have children, 
the expensive tastes argument would still apply. If we think it is valid, we 
would like to hold parents responsible even for the costs of enforcement.
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 As Brighouse (2005) notes, two conceptions of autonomy are at work 
in this debate. Alstott stresses the loss of autonomy for parents on a day-
to-day basis. "e caring commitment decreases their options. On her 
view, this is what makes child-rearing expensive and makes enforcement 
necessary. But Brighouse argues that this is not the kind of autonomy 
which matters, and that the caring commitment could in fact be seen as an 
expression of autonomy: 
‘"e person who is autonomous in the sense that matters, I think, is the 
person who is able to distance themselves from, and rationally revise, 
their emotional commitments and judgements.’ (2004: 279) 
We can apply this to the expensive tastes argument by saying that this 
second kind of autonomy is also what matters when responsibility is at 
stake. When we make an autonomous decision in this sense, one that we 
can rationally re$ect on, then we can be held responsible for it. So if the 
decision to procreate was an autonomous one in this sense, we can be held 
responsible for it – even if this decision in fact restricted our short-term 
autonomy as Alstott understands it. And then the decision to procreate 
would have to be seen as an expensive taste.
 Some of Anderson’s (1999) critique of luck egalitarianism can be 
understood in a similar way to what Alstott is saying here. Take what 
Mason (2000) calls the ‘equal access view’, which implies that
‘a person’s decision to have a family may legitimately in$uence their 
employment and training opportunities. Equality of access may obtain 
even when individuals fail in competitions for jobs or promotions […] 
as a direct or indirect result of their childcare commitments, so long as 
those commitments were incurred voluntarily.’ (2000: 231)
"is claim sounds very much like the expensive tastes challenge to Alstott’s 
views. When childcare commitments were incurred voluntarily, then the 
resulting inequalities are not problematic from an egalitarian viewpoint. 
Mason claims that, in the spirit of Anderson (1999), Anderson would 
respond to this argument by claiming that it leads to the exploitation of 
those who see themselves under a moral obligation to care for dependents 
– in practice mostly women - by not o#ering them support. Anderson and 
Alstott both appear to think that since parents are under a moral obliga-
tion to care for their children, caring is not like acting on an expensive taste 
for champagne and caviar – caring is not a lifestyle choice. 
 Alstott and Anderson are right in considering caring commitments 
special, but it cannot be because they are moral commitments that are hard 
for the parents to ful!l. It remains true that in the case of a deliberate deci-
sion to procreate, the parents need not have had children, and hence need 
not have taken up these obligations. "ere seems to be no relevant di#er-
ence to the case of somebody willingly and knowingly signing a contract 
that commits them to regular payments. Here we would say the person has 
a moral obligation to pay, because she promised to. But at the same time 
she is responsible for having signed the contract, and other things being 
equal, seems to have no right to assistance from others. It may not be the 
case that caring for an existing child can be called an expensive taste. But 
what matters is the decision to procreate in the !rst place. When parents 
choose to have children, this is based on the parents’ preference for having 
children, and this ‘taste’ is expensive, because raising children, and ful!ll-
ing their rights is expensive. 
 "e arguments I am ascribing to Alstott and Anderson here do not 
question the general validity of the expensive taste argument, although 
both are in fact critical of luck egalitarianism. Rather, they argue here that 
the expensive tastes argument does not apply, because child-rearing is not 
an expensive taste. I argued that both in a sense fail to see the importance 
of the distinction between child-rearing as the activity of ful!lling one’s 
moral obligations to existing children, and child-rearing as the original 
choice to have children, and to enter commitments. In the latter case, it is 
not so clear that child-rearing could not be regarded as an expensive taste.
 If we accept the luck egalitarian distinctions, there only seem to 
be three ways for parents not to be held responsible, and to escape the 
conclusion that parents should pay for the costs of children. Firstly, the 
children may have been entirely unplanned, and not even the consequence 
of having taken a known risk. I have said this at least is not the norm in 
developed countries today. Secondly, the parents may have been unaware 
of the costs of children. "is is also an unsatisfactory basis for compensat-
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ing disadvantaged parents: it would be a sad state of a#airs if a majority 
of parents could be regarded as stumbling into parenthood completely 
surprised by what it implies for their lives, especially since this would sug-
gest many parents may regret their decision to have children, and ful!l 
their obligations reluctantly. "irdly, we can regard the original desire to 
have children as something like a handicap, a desire the parents cannot 
be held responsible for. Again, this option does not seem very attractive. 
In Dworkin’s vein, the desire to have children would not be an expression 
of our personhood, not part of our ambitions, but of our circumstances. 
Or in Cohen’s version of the argument, parents would usually not choose 
to have the desire to have children if they could. "is simply seems to be 
an inaccurate description of how parents usually feel about children, and 
the place children have in their life plans. It would also have troublesome 
implications for parent-child relationships.
 "ere may be one other route for Alstott and Anderson to avoid, 
rather than confront the luck egalitarian challenge. I said above that luck 
egalitarianism would suggest that parents cannot be compensated for the 
costs of children when they can be held responsible for the choice to pro-
create. However any compensation must be based on some prima facie 
distribution of the relevant metric of justice. So we already have to have 
assigned the costs of children to one party or another. To be compensated, 
parents would already have to have decreased prospects, i.e. already have 
to have been assigned to pay the costs of children. It is consistent to hold 
that while parents cannot be compensated, some of the costs of children 
are not to be covered by the parents in the !rst place, but, for instance, by 
society. "is seems to very much !t what Alstott is arguing– she thinks we 
are all mutually responsible for children in society from the start.
 However, this solution seems counterintuitive for a luck egalitarian. 
It would mean that some people can make a unilateral decision which 
causes costs for others in society. "e parents’ decision would cause an 
externality. Hence the second kind of injustice we identi!ed luck egali-
tarianism as turning against occurs. Parents cause a cost to others willingly 
and knowingly and expect them to contribute. To have mutual costs with-
out a mutual decision must seem unfair to the luck egalitarian. 
 In conclusion, the most plausible luck egalitarian interpretation of 
the decision to procreate is that parents should be held responsible for all 
child-rearing costs if they made this decision willingly and knowingly, as 
most parents do. In ideal circumstances, child-rearing costs hence seem 
to o#er no grounds for compensating the parents. "ere is nothing about 
child-rearing as such that forces the luck egalitarian to give up her position 
or to admit that her distinctions do not apply. 
5. Putting together costs and cost-bearers
We have now established what the luck egalitarian answers would be to the 
questions of what children are owed, and who should pay for the children. 
Put together, are these answers acceptable? 
 Firstly, we said that parents cannot be compensated for the costs aris-
ing from their considered procreative decisions. One of these costs entails 
providing the child with equal life prospects to everybody else. "is would 
force the parents to spend a certain amount of their resources on their 
children. "is amount would be independent of how well o# the parents 
are to begin with, and depends only on di#erences in the child’s needs and 
di#erences in child-rearing skill. I can see three possible objections to this 
conclusion: the !rst is practical, the second has to do with undermining 
family integrity, and the third has to do with fairness.
 "e practical problem is that families are integrated units in that 
household spending as a whole has a big impact on all members of the 
family. It may be hard to distinguish what is spent on a child, when the 
socio-economic standing of the parents has a big impact on the child’s 
prospects. If the parents are forced to spend a large proportion of their 
resources on the child, in the form of schooling etc., their own standard 
of life may slip, which negatively a#ects the child. However, if we regard 
money spent on keeping up a certain standard of living for the whole 
family as money spent indirectly on the child’s well-being, the practical 
di%culty disappears. Of course guaranteeing this standard of living may 
be impossible for some, but this only highlights that having children and 
ful!lling one’s obligation to them is very expensive, and may be una#ord-
able for some. 
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 "e second objection focuses on the integrity of a family. It is a widely 
held belief that within the family, parents have certain rights over their 
children, and that the state should not normally interfere with the internal 
workings of a family (see Brighouse and Swift 2006). It also seems to be 
a common belief that, within limits, parents have the right to raise their 
children within their own social context, so that they might live a life simi-
lar to their own. Both of these rights may seem to be undermined by what 
I identi!ed as the luck egalitarian position, since it imposes such strong 
restrictions on parents: parents have a duty to provide their children with 
life prospects that are equal to everybody else’s.
 With regard to the right to non-interference, the luck egalitarian may 
respond in the following way: on most views of what it is that ought to be 
equalised, equal life prospects are realisable in many ways. Firstly, people 
di#er from one another, partly because of their upbringing, with regard 
to what they value in life. "is a#ects what distribution of goods would 
constitute equality. Secondly, there are di#erent ways of life that could be 
judged equivalent by one and the same person. "irdly, there are di#erent 
routes to arrive at any way of life. Hence parents are still guaranteed some 
freedom to decide how to raise their children. "e demand for equal life 
prospects does not require uniformity in children’s upbringing, or regula-
tion of family life in a set way. Furthermore, while it is true that the duty 
we identi!ed is very demanding, the luck egalitarian may decide against 
enforcement if that would interfere too much with the working of a fam-
ily, which may be harmful especially to the children. 
 "e second point, about parents having a right to bring children up 
in a way of life similar to their own, is harder to counter for the luck 
egalitarian. "e parental freedom just described may not include bring-
ing up the children in the same way of life they lead. Consider the strong 
sense of working class consciousness that existed in England until recently. 
Parents would consider it important to pass this consciousness on to their 
children. At the same time, class consciousness may keep the children from 
rising in the social ladder in later life. If we make those who are worse o# 
today responsible for ensuring equal life prospects for their children, they 
are hit much harder: raising their children to live a life di#erent from their 
own is more di%cult, and means they cannot pass on their values and way 
of life to their children.
 "e third objection I mentioned has a similar conclusion. "e luck 
egalitarian position makes it relatively more expensive for those with fewer 
resources to have children. In fact, it may be una#ordable to the poor. We 
have said that ensuring equal life prospects for one’s children probably 
requires keeping up a certain life-style for the family as a whole. But how 
should the worse o# achieve that while also spending enough resources 
on the child? "e luck egalitarian position sketched here basically makes 
the parents pay the costs of egalitarianism. But these costs are much too 
high for the worst-o#. "is seems unjust, especially when we consider how 
important and deeply meaningful the decision to procreate is considered 
by many. For instance, Dyck (1973) considers the right to procreate as 
fundamental as a right to life. It would be deeply counterintuitive if luck 
egalitarianism made it impossible or unacceptably expensive for the poorer 
in society to have children. But no luck egalitarian thinks that luck egali-
tarianism can be applied straightforwardly under non-ideal conditions, 
that is, conditions in which inequalities exist. To what extent could a luck 
egalitarian spirit carry over to a non-ideal situation?
6. Ideal and non-ideal theory
So far, we have ignored the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. 
"is distinction is common in political philosophy at least since Rawls 
(1971). In ideal theory, we typically assume perfect compliance to those 
principles that make a society perfectly just (Robeyns 2008). Consider-
ing the distinction here is very relevant, since it is a major criticism of 
luck egalitarianism, especially Dworkin’s variant, that it is not clear how it 
translates from ideal to non-ideal theory (see Swift 2008). 
 Luck egalitarianism is ‘ideal’ since we usually assume perfect equal-
ity as a starting point. Here, the problems we just described do not arise: 
parents are all in an equal position to begin with, and are equally capable 
of paying for the costs of children. "ey have to provide their children 
with life prospects equal to their own – which would also preserve family 
integrity as we described it. Hence, in ideal theory, it seems plausible that 
parents should be held responsible for the costs of ensuring equality in the 
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next generation. 
 In the case of non-ideal theory, it is not even clear what ‘equal life 
prospects’ would be and hence how much exactly children are owed. Are 
they life prospects equal to the average of the entire population when they 
are born? Life prospects equal to those that children born at the same time 
can expect? Maybe the answer closest to the luck egalitarian spirit is that 
they refer to how well o# the child would be in a hypothetical situation of 
equality. But this may be hard to know. Let us assume, however, that we 
have at least a rough idea.
 Given the confusion over the interpretation of luck egalitarianism in 
non-ideal theory, I just want to consider how a luck egalitarian might deal 
with the problem of procreation in an unequal society. While it does not 
seem problematic to hold parents responsible for the costs of egalitarian-
ism if they live in an equal society, this seems deeply unfair in an unequal 
society. A luck egalitarian can acknowledge this, while still upholding that 
parents are responsible for their reproductive decisions. 
 We can distinguish those costs of children which arise from our theory 
of justice – like the cost of ensuring equal life prospects - from those which 
arise from rights the child has qua human being, like the right to basic 
care. It seems plausible that parents should be responsible for the latter 
fully, but not for the former when they are disadvantaged themselves. Of 
course, these costs may overlap. But all that is required is that we can !x 
some minimum that a child needs quite apart from egalitarian considera-
tions, and that parents are de!nitely held responsible for. We can deduct 
this from the total costs of children and treat the remainder as the egalitar-
ian costs of children, which should be treated di#erently as we will explore 
in the following.
 "en how should the egalitarian costs of children be distributed? It 
seems to me to be most consistent with luck egalitarianism that the costs 
should be distributed in rough proportion to the family’s endowments. 
Each family’s responsibility would be to provide for the child prospects 
roughly equal to their own. Poor parents would have everything that 
goes beyond that paid for by richer parents, who are required to subsidise 
poorer parents on top of providing equal life prospects for their own child. 
 "e advantage of such a distribution is that relative to the parents’ 
resources, the costs of having children are roughly the same. "is approxi-
mates Dworkin’s ideal of how persons should form their ambitions. To 
quote again:
‘"at is the view of a person […] as someone who forms his ambitions 
with a sense of their cost to others against some presumed initial equality 
of economic power.’ (2000: 81-82)
Note also that poor parents are only subsidised by rich parents, not by 
everybody in society. In this way, nobody is incentivised more or less than 
others to have children – in a relative way, each takes into account the costs 
they are causing for others. At the same time, the childless would not be 
a#ected: Rich parents would be supporting poor parents to cover the costs 
of children. If the childless also had to compensate for the costs of poor 
parents’ children, they would again be asked to pay for the voluntary deci-
sions of others to incur costs, which the luck egalitarian must !nd unjust. 
But rich parents make the decision to have a child, so we can expect them 
to contribute to the costs of ensuring equality in the next generation.
 "is proposal hence seems to not depart too much from the luck egali-
tarian spirit. At the same time, what some have described as a fundamental 
right or at least as deeply meaningful and important, the ability to procre-
ate and care for children, seems ensured: relative to one’s resources, having 
children is not overly costly. 
 "ere are a number of complications that I have bracketed. Firstly, this 
proposal is insensitive to sources of current inequality, whether people can 
or cannot be held responsible for their social standing. On a theoretical 
level, my rough proposal may have to be revised to deal with this. However 
in practice, these sources are usually intractable and do not have any bear-
ing on policy. 
 Furthermore, the policy only works when the poor do not have more 
children than the rich on average – in that case child-rearing would become 
very expensive again for the poor. Such di#erential birth rates should not 
be encouraged by the policy, however, since all parents would face similar 
costs relative to how well o# they are. Still, for other structural reasons, this 
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may be the case anyway, as it is in many developed countries today. For 
instance, in Germany, childlessness amongst women who graduated from 
university (and who are hence likely to be more advantaged economically) 
is about three times as high (35-39%) as the total average (Dorbritz 2008). 
"is highlights the limitations of focusing on just one policy in the realm 
of non-ideal theory. Of course, in non-ideal theory, luck egalitarianism 
also strives to reduce existing inequalities, and to limit the e#ects these 
inequalities have – of which di#erences in birth rates may be one. In prac-
tice, these other goals will also have a bearing on actual policy regarding 
child care. And then, even the childless may be asked to support child care.
 "ere are further complications that I have bracketed, such as what 
to do in the case where children were truly unplanned and unexpected. 
It is not clear how to even identify these cases. Furthermore, children do 
not only cause costs, but come with bene!ts for all: they also have posi-
tive externalities. "is has been used as an argument to tax the childless to 
support children (see Folbre 2008). Finally, I have focused on providing 
children with the care and education to ensure at least equal life prospects 
for them, and the di%culties for disadvantaged parents to achieve this. 
"ere is also the problem of advantaged parents who want to give their 
children a better start in life. "ere is an existing debate about gift-giving 
in luck egalitarianism which I cannot explore here. But in a sense, what I 
have proposed limits the extent of this problem, because rich parents are 
asked to subsidise poor parents and hence already have increased costs to 
child-rearing.
7. Conclusion
So what can we say now with respect to our two motivating questions:
1.What are children owed? 
2.Who should pay for the children? 
Disregarding existing inequalities, the luck egalitarian would say that chil-
dren are owed equal life prospects, and that when having the child was a 
conscious decision, parents should be held responsible for guaranteeing 
these equal life prospects. 
 Now thinking of an actual society where inequalities exist, in many 
cases, we can indeed hold parents responsible for their procreative decisions. 
Procreative decisions and the deliberate taking on of caring commitments 
can in fact be seen as an expression of autonomy. "is has been under-
estimated by those advocating mutual obligations towards children. But 
procreative decisions are now very expensive for some if we hold, also in 
the luck egalitarian vein, that children are owed equal life prospects. "is 
may make child-rearing una#ordable to some.
 "e insight which can help us resolve this problem is that many of 
the costs of children are costs of egalitarian justice and go beyond what 
children are owed qua human being. And these egalitarian costs of chil-
dren cannot reasonably be borne by the poor in a society that is unequal. 
"ere are many complications regarding the question of how to divide 
these costs in non-ideal theory. Luck egalitarianism should strive to hold 
parents responsible for as much of the cost as is reasonable given their ini-
tial endowments, to re$ect in a relative way the costs their decisions have 
for society. However, in actual policy, other goals on the way to achieving 
greater equality will play a role.
 I believe that the recognition that many of the costs of children are 
costs of egalitarian justice is a useful one. In non-ideal theory, it provides a 
ground for sharing costs even when parents are fully responsible for their 
decision to procreate. We do not have to rely on arguments that children 
are unwanted, or that parents are all taken by surprise by the costs children 
cause, or that they frequently fail in their duties, to arrive at a mutual obli-
gation towards children. "e argument instead is that it is unfair to make 
parents bear the full costs of doing justice to their children when they are 
themselves disadvantaged in an unequal society.
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